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  OPINION 
_____________________  
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 A jury in the District of the Virgin Islands convicted 
defendant Shawn Tyson of numerous federal firearms 
offenses, including twelve counts of transporting a firearm in 
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the course of dealing firearms without a license, one count of 
transporting a firearm with knowledge or reasonable cause to 
believe that it would be used to commit a crime, one count of 
transferring a firearm to an out-of-state resident, and one 
count of conspiring to unlawfully transport firearms.  The 
jury also found Tyson guilty of ten counts of unauthorized 
possession of a firearm under Virgin Islands law.  Following 
pronouncement of the verdict, the District Court granted 
Tyson a judgment of acquittal on each of the federal counts.  
Such relief was denied with respect to the convictions 
charging violations of the Virgin Islands Code. 
 We are presented with cross appeals from the final 
judgment entered by the District Court.  Tyson challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence introduced in support of the 
counts arising under local law, while the government 
contends that we should reinstate the jury‘s verdict on the 
federal firearms counts.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude that Tyson‘s appeal is without merit.  We also 
conclude that the District Court was correct to enter judgment 
of acquittal on the conspiracy count sounding in federal law.  
With respect to the remaining federal counts, however, we 
agree with the government‘s contention that the District Court 
erred by granting Tyson Rule 29 relief.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the judgment in part and remand the matter with 
instructions to reinstate the jury verdict on each of the federal 
counts save that charging Tyson with conspiracy to transport 
firearms in violation of federal law. 
I 
 It is not difficult to acquire a firearm legally in the 
state of Tennessee.  A firearms license is not required to buy 
most guns.  Rather, an interested purchaser need only pass an 
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instant background check,
1
 required by state law, and 
complete a Form 4473, required by the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).
2
  Virgin Islands 
law is more stringent.  An interested buyer must obtain a 
firearms license from the Virgin Islands Police 
Commissioner.  23 V.I.C. § 455.  Only a Virgin Islands 
resident may obtain such a license, 23 V.I.C. § 456(a)(2), and 
the Commissioner is empowered to deny a license request for, 
inter alia, prior felony conviction, mental incompetence, 
habitual drunkenness, or for being an ―improper person‖ 
(whatever that means), 23 V.I.C. § 458(a).  Each firearm 
purchased in or imported into the Virgin Islands must be 
registered with the police.  23 V.I.C. § 470. 
 Tyson apparently looked at the Islands‘ regulated gun 
market and saw an arbitrage opportunity.  To capitalize on 
this, he began purchasing a significant quantity of firearms in 
his home state of Tennessee, where procurement was easy, 
and then transporting those weapons to the Virgin Islands for 
resale.  The scheme began in earnest in late 2007.  On 
December 1, Tyson bought two semiautomatic rifles from a 
pawn shop near his home in Bristol, Tennessee.  He 
purchased a semiautomatic pistol from a gun store in 
neighboring Jonesboro the following day.
3
  On December 11, 
                                                 
1
  The instant background check ensures the potential purchaser is 
not a convicted felon and is not the subject of an active restraining 
order. 
2
 Form 4473 records a purchaser‘s identification information and 
the firearm‘s make, model, and serial number.  The purchaser must 
also sign a short affidavit stating that he or she is eligible under 
federal law to purchase firearms. 
3
 Tyson acquired these weapons legally; prior to each transaction, 
he passed the instant background check required by the state of 
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2007, Tyson flew from Tennessee to St. Thomas—his first of 
four trips over the course of the next seven months.  He 
returned to Tennessee on January 10, 2008.  Within three 
weeks, Tyson had purchased eight more semiautomatic 
weapons.  Two of these were rifles; six were handguns. 
 Tyson made a second trip to the Virgin Islands on 
February 6.  Delta Airlines ticketing agent Dudley Breeding 
assisted Tyson with his luggage and recalled that Tyson 
checked a large, black rectangular suitcase that contained 
firearms.
4
  Tyson told Breeding he was an antique gun 
collector and intended to sell the weapons when he reached 
St. Thomas.  However, Tyson was not licensed to sell or 
possess firearms in the Virgin Islands.
5
  Nor was he licensed 
under federal law to sell or transport firearms for sale in 
interstate commerce.
6
  Tyson also failed to register the 
weapons with the Virgin Islands police when he arrived in St. 
Thomas. 
                                                                                                             
Tennessee and completed Form 4473.  Indeed, Tyson complied 
with these requirements each time he purchased a firearm in 
Tennessee. 
4
  Federal regulations allow airline passengers to transport firearms 
provided they are checked for in-flight storage and packed in a 
locked, hard-side container.  49 C.F.R. § 1544.203(f).  In addition, 
a passenger must complete a declaration form at the ticketing 
counter stating that each firearm contained in his or her baggage is 
unloaded.  See id. § 1544.203(f)(2)(i).  Tyson complied with these 
requirements each time he flew to the Virgin Islands. 
5
 With certain exceptions not applicable here, see 23 V.I.C. § 453, 
Virgin Islands law makes it unlawful to possess a firearm without a 
license, 23 V.I.C. § 454; 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a). 
6
 Federal law states that only a licensed importer, manufacturer, or 
dealer may import, manufacture, or deal firearms in interstate 
commerce.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922. 
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 Tyson returned from the Virgin Islands on February 
13, accompanied by an individual named Kelroy Morrell.  
The following day, Tyson purchased seven semiautomatic 
firearms from local merchants in and around Bristol, 
Tennessee.  Later that evening, local law enforcement 
received reports that someone was firing a gun from the front 
porch of Tyson‘s residence.  When Bristol police officers 
arrived, they confronted the owner of the home, Sherry 
Wagner.  She feigned ignorance but allowed the officers to 
enter the home so they could speak with Tyson. 
 Officers encountered Tyson and Morrell when they 
entered the residence.  A 9mm pistol sat in plain view atop a 
nearby coffee table.  Wagner and Tyson stated that they were 
unsure if there were more guns in the house.  Officers found 
several when they entered Tyson‘s bedroom: two rifles were 
propped against the wall; several smaller firearms were 
hidden underneath Tyson‘s mattress; empty boxes, which 
once packaged firearms, littered the bedroom floor.  A 
consensual search of the premises also produced receipts for 
multiple firearms purchases, ammunition, magazines for 
ammunition, and business cards belonging to sundry local 
gun merchants.  Ultimately, however, this incident led to no 
arrests, for the guns had been purchased legally and none of 
the items discovered in Tyson‘s home are considered 
contraband under state or federal law. 
 Tyson continued to acquire guns.  He bought one 
semiautomatic rifle and two semiautomatic pistols from 
Tull‘s Store in Selmer, Tennessee on February 16.  He 
purchased an additional semiautomatic pistol from the same 
dealer the next day.  On February 18, Tyson bought two more 
pistols from a merchant in Kingsport.  He acquired another 
semiautomatic handgun on February 19.  In sum, Tyson 
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purchased fourteen semiautomatic firearms between February 
13, when he returned from the Virgin Islands with Morrell, 
and February 19. 
On February 20, Tyson and Morrell arrived at the Tri-
Cities Regional Airport.  Each was toting a hard plastic 
suitcase full of guns.  Their destination was St. Thomas.  
Delta ticketing agent Breeding assisted both men with their 
luggage.  During the course of casual conversation, Tyson 
again told Breeding that he had a buyer for the weapons in the 
Virgin Islands.  None of the weapons were registered with the 
Virgin Islands police when Tyson arrived at his destination. 
On February 23, Tyson returned to Bristol without 
Morrell.  He entered active duty service with the Tennessee 
Army National Guard three days later.  There Tyson would 
remain until July 3, 2008, when he graduated as a private 
second class and was discharged home. 
 Tyson was but a few days removed from National 
Guard training before he was again buying firearms in 
sizeable quantities.  He bought one pistol on July 12, five 
more on July 24, and two on July 28.  On July 31, he set off 
on his fourth trip to the Virgin Islands.  This time, federal law 
enforcement officers were waiting for him.  Customs and 
Border Patrol notified ATF agent Jamie Jenkins that Tyson 
had checked in for a flight and was carrying eleven firearms 
in a hard plastic suitcase.  He also had a significant quantity 
of ammunition in a separate black duffel bag.  Agent Jenkins 
then contacted Penny Stricklin, an ATF agent stationed in the 
Virgin Islands.  He told Stricklin that Tyson was destined for 
St. Thomas, firearms in tow.  Apparently, Tyson‘s island 
visits had not gone unnoticed. 
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 Stricklin determined that Tyson had neither a license 
to possess or distribute firearms in the Virgin Islands nor a 
federal license to import or deal firearms in the territories of 
the United States.  She therefore obtained a warrant to search 
Tyson‘s luggage.  She also arranged for federal and local law 
enforcement to intercept Tyson when he exited the airport. 
 Morrell and a second individual, Curtiss Thomas, were 
waiting outside the airport in Morrell‘s parked car when 
Tyson landed.  Morrell stayed in the vehicle for several 
minutes before exiting the car and entering the airport.  
Deputy United States Marshal Brian Biermann, who was 
watching from a nearby vantage point, recalled that Tyson 
eventually exited the airport and, along with Morrell, ―they 
had a red cap help[] with some baggage into the trunk of the 
vehicle.‖  Tyson then closed the trunk and entered the 
vehicle‘s back seat. 
 Once Tyson was inside the car, Morrell began to drive 
toward the airport exit.  He did not get far before Virgin 
Islands police and federal agents stopped the vehicle.  
Stricklin opened Morrell‘s trunk and seized the hard plastic 
suitcase and black duffel bag that Tyson had checked in 
Tennessee.  This baggage contained a total of eleven firearms, 
500 rounds of ammunition, and several ammunition 
magazines.  Tyson, Morrell, and Thomas were arrested and 
Virgin Islands police impounded Morrell‘s car.  Morrell later 
consented to a vehicle search, whereupon agents discovered 
an additional handgun hidden beneath the passenger seat.
7
  
                                                 
7
 The handgun belonged to Thomas.  He was tried separately on 
charges of unlawfully transporting a firearm in interstate 
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), and unauthorized 
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Meanwhile, Tyson told Stricklin that he was visiting St. 
Thomas in order to see his mother.  When Stricklin asked him 
about the guns, Tyson stated that he intended to register them 
with the local police.  Stricklin told Tyson she thought he was 
lying.  At this point, Tyson decided to say no more. 
II 
 On October 2, 2008, a grand jury indicted Tyson and 
Morrell on one count of conspiracy to unlawfully transport 
firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One); twelve 
counts of transporting a firearm in the course of dealing 
firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(a)(1)(A) (Counts Two through Thirteen); eleven counts 
of unauthorized possession of a firearm, in violation of 14 
V.I.C. § 2253(a) (Counts Fourteen through Twenty-Four); 
one count of transporting a firearm with knowledge or 
reasonable cause to believe it would be used to commit a 
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) (Count Twenty-
Five); and one count of transferring a firearm to an out-of-
state resident, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) (Count 
Twenty-Six).  Tyson and Morrell were tried jointly on all 
charges.
8
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
                                                                                                             
possession of a firearm under 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a).  Thomas was 
acquitted by a jury of both charges. 
8
  Tyson filed a pretrial motion to suppress ―all evidence gathered 
in this case, starting from the initial contact on February 14, 2008, 
in Tennessee.‖  The District Court denied the motion after an 
evidentiary hearing.  In his opening brief, Tyson identifies the 
Court‘s suppression order as one of three issues he is contesting on 
appeal.  Tyson does not, however, single out any error in the 
District Court‘s ruling, nor does he substantively address the 
search(es) whose constitutionality he now assails.  Tyson has 
therefore waived the issue for purposes of appeal.  See Kach v. 
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U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612. 
During its case-in-chief, the government presented 
evidence that Tyson purchased a total of thirty-five firearms 
between December 1, 2007 and July 28, 2008.  Only twelve 
of those weapons were recovered.  Eleven were seized during 
the July 31 traffic stop in St. Thomas.  The twelfth was 
recovered on June 30, 2008 when Virgin Islands police 
apprehended an individual named Jelani LaTorre.  LaTorre 
was carrying narcotics and a Hi-Point 9mm handgun whose 
serial number had been obliterated.  Forensics experts traced 
the firearm and determined that Tyson had purchased the 
weapon in Tennessee for $139 on February 16, 2008, four 
days before making his third trip to St. Thomas.  Two weeks 
prior to this acquisition, LaTorre wired Tyson $330 from St. 
Thomas. 
 The evidence of firearm trafficking did not end there.  
Bristol police searched Tyson‘s residence one week after his 
arrest.  Among other items, they recovered a document that 
appeared to depict a kind of code.  At the top of the 
document, the following notations were written: 
―CARSHOW = GUNSHOW‖; ―RIMS = GUNS‖; ―TIRES = 
AMMO.‖  Eleven ―RIMS‖ were then listed on the page.  
Beside each ―RIM,‖ a number was written.  According to 
ATF agent Jenkins, these numbers corresponded to the caliber 
of a firearm model or a type of ammunition.  Thus, for 
example, beside ―RIM #1909‖ the notation ―9MM‖ was 
written.  The number ―.40‖ appeared adjacent to ―RIM 
                                                                                                             
Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 642 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that ―a passing 
reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before th[e] 
court‖ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United 
States v. Demichael, 461 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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#1540.‖  Other entries were even less veiled.  ―12ga – 
SHOTGUN‖ was written next to ―RIM #1112.‖  Another 
entry read, ―RIM #1762 = 7.62X39 – AK47/SKS.‖ 
 Officers also recovered a notepad containing a 
handwritten list of firearms.  A number was written next to 
each firearm.  To illustrate: the number ―664.41‖ was written 
beside ―Glock 40.‖  Agent Jenkins testified that these 
numbers appeared to represent each firearm‘s cash value.  On 
another page of the notepad, someone had written the letters 
―AK‖ and ―AR.‖9  Next to each notation were two columns 
labeled ―Spent‖ and ―Profit.‖  With respect to AK: the 
number ―500‖ was written below ―Spent,‖ while ―2000‖ was 
written below ―Profit.‖  With respect to AR: the number 
―600‖ appeared under ―Spent‖ and ―1900‖ under ―Profit.‖ 
 At the close of the government‘s evidence, Tyson filed 
a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 29(a).  The District Court reserved 
ruling on the motion and proceeded with trial.
10
  Tyson 
presented no evidence in his defense; Morrell testified on his 
own behalf.  The jury acquitted Morrell on all charges.  
Tyson, however, was convicted on all counts except one 
                                                 
9
 Agent Jenkins explained that the AK-47 and the AR-15 assault 
rifle are well-known firearms whose names begin with the letters 
appearing on the notepad. 
10
  Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(b), the district 
court ―may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with trial 
(where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), 
submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the 
jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is 
discharged without having returned a verdict.‖  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
29(b). 
12 
 
count of unauthorized possession of a firearm under local 
law.
11
 
 Tyson renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal 
after the jury returned its verdict.  In a written order dated 
August 12, 2009, the District Court granted Tyson‘s motion 
as it pertained to each of the federal firearms counts (Counts 
One through Thirteen and Twenty-Five through Twenty-Six).  
The Court denied the motion with respect to the counts 
charging unauthorized possession of a firearm under Virgin 
Islands law (Counts Fourteen through Twenty-Three).   
The parties filed timely cross appeals.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III 
 On a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29(a), the court ―must enter a judgment of acquittal 
of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain 
a conviction.‖  Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).  The evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction if a rational trier of fact 
could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 
2005).  We review the district court‘s disposition of a Rule 29 
motion de novo, applying the same standard the district court 
was required to apply.  United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 
78, 83 (3d Cir. 2011).  We will ―sustain the verdict if there is 
                                                 
11
  Tyson was acquitted of Count Twenty-Four of the indictment.  
According to special agent Jay Quabius of the ATF, the firearm 
named in this count, which was one of the eleven seized on July 
31, 2008, was inoperable.  A conviction for unauthorized 
possession of a firearm under 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) requires that the 
firearm at issue be operable.  See 14 V.I.C. § 451(d). 
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substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, to uphold the jury‘s decision.‖  United States v. 
Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United 
States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
Under this deferential standard of review, an appellate court 
―‗must be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the jury by 
weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or 
by substituting [the court‘s] judgment for that of the jury.‘‖  
United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133).  A finding of insufficiency 
should be reserved for those situations in which ―the 
prosecution‘s failure is clear.‖  United States v. Mercado, 610 
F.3d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Tyson moved for Rule 29 relief at the conclusion of 
the government‘s case-in-chief.  The District Court reserved 
decision on the motion and Tyson presented no evidence in 
his defense.  Under Rule 29(b), ―[i]f the court reserves 
decision, it must decide the motion on the basis of the 
evidence at the time the ruling was reserved.‖  Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 29(b).  Accordingly, our review of the evidence is limited 
to that which was presented during the government‘s case-in-
chief, ―including evidence elicited on cross-examination of 
the government witnesses.‖  Brodie, 403 F.3d at 134; see also 
United States v. Moore, 504 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that Rule 29 entitles the defendant ―to a snapshot 
of the evidence at the point that the court reserves its ruling‖). 
 Having set forth the appropriate standard of review, we 
now proceed to the specific counts of conviction.  We begin 
with the counts charging violation of federal law before 
proceeding to the counts arising under the Virgin Islands 
Code. 
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A Transporting a Firearm in the Course of Dealing 
Firearms Without a License 
 Tyson was charged and convicted on twelve counts of 
transporting a firearm in the course of dealing firearms 
without a license—a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).12  
Section 922(a)(1)(A) states that it is unlawful for any person 
except a licensed importer, licensed 
manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in 
the business of importing, manufacturing, or 
dealing in firearms, or in the course of such 
business to ship, transport, or receive any 
firearm in interstate or foreign commerce[.] 
To obtain a conviction under this provision, the government 
must show that the defendant (1) engaged in the business of 
dealing in firearms; (2) was not a federally licensed firearms 
dealer; and (3) acted willfully.  United States v. Palmieri, 21 
F.3d 1265, 1268–70 & n.4 (3d Cir.), vacated on other 
grounds, 513 U.S. 957 (1994); see also United States v. 
Sanchez-Corcino, 85 F.3d 549, 554 (11th Cir. 1996); 18 
U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (providing mens rea requirement). 
 The District Court held that there was sufficient 
evidence to prove Tyson was not a federally licensed firearms 
dealer, but insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he was 
―engaged in the business of dealing in firearms.‖13  But what 
                                                 
12
 The firearms identified in these twelve counts correspond to the 
eleven firearms seized on July 31, 2008, as well as the firearm 
seized from Jelani LaTorre on June 30, 2008. 
13
 The District Court did not address the mens rea requirement 
because it found the government‘s failure to prove the first element 
of the crime to be dispositive. 
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does it mean to be ―engaged in the business of dealing in 
firearms‖?  According to the statute, a person is so engaged 
when he or she ―devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing 
in firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the 
principal objective of livelihood and profit through the 
repetitive purchase and resale of firearms.‖  18 U.S.C. § 
921(a)(21)(C).  To conduct business ―‗with the principal 
objective of livelihood and profit‘ means that the intent 
underlying the sale or disposition of firearms is 
predominantly one of obtaining livelihood and pecuniary 
gain, as opposed to other intents, such as improving or 
liquidating a personal firearms collection.‖  18 U.S.C. § 
921(a)(22).  In this vein, the statute explicitly exempts those 
who ―make[] occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of 
firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or for a 
hobby, or who sell[] all or part of [their] personal collection 
of firearms.‖  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C). 
 By the statute‘s terms, then, a defendant engages in the 
business of dealing in firearms when his principal motivation 
is economic (i.e., ―obtaining livelihood‖ and ―profit‖) and he 
pursues this objective through the repetitive purchase and 
resale of firearms.  Palmieri, 21 F.3d at 1268 (stating that 
―economic interests‖ are the ―principal purpose,‖ and 
―repetitiveness‖ is ―the modus operandi‖).  Although the 
quantity and frequency of sales are obviously a central 
concern, so also are (1) the location of the sales, (2) the 
conditions under which the sales occurred, (3) the defendant‘s 
behavior before, during, and after the sales, (4) the price 
charged for the weapons and the characteristics of the 
firearms sold, and (5) the intent of the seller at the time of the 
sales.  Id. (explaining that ―the finder of fact must examine 
the intent of the actor and all circumstances surrounding the 
16 
 
acts alleged to constitute engaging in business‖).  As is often 
the case in such analyses, the importance of any one of these 
considerations is subject to the idiosyncratic nature of the fact 
pattern presented. 
 Here, the government presented substantial indirect 
evidence of repetitive sales.  Over the course of 
approximately seven months, Tyson flew to the Virgin 
Islands four times.  Directly before each of these trips, he 
purchased several firearms in Tennessee.  Tyson carried some 
number of these weapons on at least three of his flights and 
he never registered a single gun with the local police when he 
landed in St. Thomas.  In total, Tyson purchased thirty-five 
firearms during the relevant time period.  Only twelve were 
ever recovered; eleven guns were seized on July 31 and one 
weapon—with its serial number obliterated—was confiscated 
from Jelani LaTorre.  A reasonable jury could conclude from 
this evidence that Tyson sold the twenty-three unrecovered 
(and unregistered) firearms during his first three trips to the 
Virgin Islands.  A jury could further infer that Tyson had 
similar intentions for the eleven guns with which he was 
apprehended on the day of his arrest. 
 There was also evidence that Tyson‘s repetitive sales 
were driven by a pecuniary motive.  In January 2008, LaTorre 
wired $330 to Tyson in Tennessee.  Several weeks later, 
Tyson purchased a Hi-Point 9mm handgun for $139.  The 
jury was free to infer from this evidence that Tyson had not 
only sold LaTorre the weapon, but that he did so for a 
sizeable markup.  Such profit-seeking behavior falls squarely 
within the statutory definition of firearms dealing.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 921(a)(22).  In addition, the government introduced 
a notepad seized from Tyson‘s residence in Tennessee.  One 
page of the pad contained the notations ―AK‖ and ―AR,‖ 
17 
 
along with two columns labeled ―Spent‖ and ―Profit.‖  Agent 
Jenkins testified that the AK-47 and AR-15 assault rifle were 
two of the more common semiautomatic firearms available 
for sale in Tennessee.  Tyson bought several of each.  On the 
notepad, the number ―2000‖ appeared below the ―Profit‖ 
column next to ―AK‖; the number ―1900‖ was written in the 
―Profit‖ column corresponding to ―AR.‖  The jury could well 
have reasoned that the word ―Profit‖ meant exactly what it 
said and that the numbers appearing in this column reflected a 
positive monetary yield.  What is more, the overall timing and 
condition of the sales strongly suggests a pecuniary motive.  
Before each trip to St. Thomas, Tyson embarked on a 
purchasing spree, only to resell his newly-acquired arsenal 
when he arrived in the Virgin Islands.  This buy-fly-resell 
pattern of behavior seems susceptible of no other explanation 
than one of economic gain. 
 The government‘s evidence is bolstered by the fact 
that Tyson himself admitted that he was traveling to the 
Virgin Islands in order to buy and sell firearms.  Delta 
ticketing agent Breeding testified that she assisted Tyson with 
his baggage prior to several of his flights.  Each time, Tyson 
told Breeding that he intended to sell the firearms packed in 
his luggage once he arrived in the Virgin Islands.  In one 
instance, Tyson said ―that he was an antique gun buyer and 
collector, and that he had a purchaser for all of the guns when 
he got back to the islands.‖  The District Court discounted 
these assertions as ―mere puffery.‖  Such a finding was 
unwarranted in light of the record as a whole.  Indeed, there 
was ample evidence that Tyson was transporting large 
numbers of firearms to the Virgin Islands in order to turn a 
profit from their resale.  Thus, when Tyson told Breeding that 
this was exactly what he was up to, the jury had every right to 
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conclude that he was telling the truth.  By minimizing 
Tyson‘s assertions, the District Court overrode the jury‘s 
credibility determination and substituted its own.  This was 
error.  See United States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344, 348 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (stating that ―[w]e do not weigh evidence or 
determine the credibility of witnesses‖ on sufficiency of the 
evidence review (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 For the reasons set forth above, we find that the 
government put on substantial proof to show that Tyson was 
engaged in the business of dealing in firearms.  The record 
further demonstrates that he did so with a sufficiently 
culpable state of mind.  A defendant must act willfully to be 
criminally liable under § 922(a)(1)(A).  See 18 U.S.C. § 
924(a)(1)(D).  A ―willful‖ action is ―one undertaken with a 
‗bad purpose‘‖ or an ―evil-meaning mind.‖  Bryan v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 184, 191, 193 (1998).  Proof of willfulness 
therefore requires evidence that ―the defendant acted with 
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.‖  Id. at 192 
(interpreting the term ―willfully‖ in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D)) 
(quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)). 
Tyson completed an ATF Form 4473 for each firearm 
he purchased in Tennessee.  This form contains language 
printed in bold directly above the signature line that states, ―I 
. . . understand that the repetitive purchase of firearms for the 
purpose of resale for livelihood and profit without a Federal 
firearms license is a violation of the law.‖  Each time he 
signed a Form 4473, Tyson certified his knowledge of the 
law.  This alone is sufficient to demonstrate willfulness in the 
circumstances present here.  See United States v. Hayden, 64 
F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1995).  And there was more. 
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Tyson undertook measures to conceal his trafficking 
activity.  He kept coded records.  He told others that he was 
selling ―antique‖ guns, presumably because he knew that 
―antique‖ firearms are exempted from the trafficking statute.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1)(3) (defining ―firearm‖ and stating 
that ―antique‖ firearms are not considered ―firearms‖ for 
purposes of the trafficking statute).  Similarly, Tyson called 
himself a firearms ―collector,‖ which, if true, would also have 
shielded him from criminal trafficking liability.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C) (stating that one who ―makes 
occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the 
enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who 
sells all or part of his personal collection of firearms‖ is not a 
―dealer in firearms‖).  These were lies designed to game the 
system.  After all, none of the firearms purchased by Tyson 
were antiques and his behavior was decidedly inconsistent 
with that of a collector.
14
  The jury could reasonably conclude 
that by calling himself a ―collector,‖ and by describing his 
firearms as ―antiques,‖ Tyson crafted a falsehood with the 
statute‘s exemptions in mind.  Such behavior betrays 
knowledge of unlawful conduct. 
In sum, the District Court committed error when it set 
aside Tyson‘s conviction on twelve counts of transporting a 
firearm in the course of dealing firearms without a license.  
We will vacate the judgment of acquittal with orders to 
reinstate the jury‘s verdict on each of the twelve counts. 
B Transporting a Firearm in Interstate Commerce with 
the Intent to Commit a Crime 
                                                 
14
 Nor does Tyson claim that he was a firearms ―collector‖ on 
appeal. 
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 The jury convicted Tyson of one count of transporting 
a firearm in interstate commerce with knowledge or 
reasonable cause to believe that it would be used to commit a 
crime, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(b).  That section 
provides: 
Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an 
offense punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, or with knowledge or 
reasonable cause to believe that an offense 
punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year is to be committed 
therewith, ships, transports, or receives a 
firearm or any ammunition in interstate or 
foreign commerce shall be fined under this title, 
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 
To be convicted under the statute, then, the defendant must 
(1) transport a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce, and 
(2) intend to commit a crime with the weapon, have actual 
knowledge that a crime will be committed with the weapon, 
or have reasonable cause to believe that a crime will be 
committed with the weapon.  The indictment alleged that 
Tyson transported eleven firearms to the Virgin Islands on 
July 31, 2008, with either knowledge or reasonable cause to 
believe that the weapons would be possessed without a 
locally issued license.  Possession under such circumstances 
is a crime in the Virgin Islands, punishable by at least one 
year in prison.  14 V.I.C. § 2253(a). 
 There is no question that Tyson moved the eleven 
firearms in interstate commerce.  Our focus thus centers 
exclusively upon § 924(b)‘s mens rea requirement.  Proof of a 
defendant‘s subjective knowledge can be difficult to 
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establish, especially when he or she has reason to obfuscate.  
But Tyson was charged with, and convicted of, knowing or 
having ―reasonable cause to believe‖ that the weapons would 
be used to commit the predicate offense.
15
  The government 
contends that even if it did not prove actual knowledge, it at 
                                                 
15
 We have yet to address the meaning of ―reasonable cause to 
believe‖ in the context of § 924(b) or a similar statute.  In United 
States v. McBane, 433 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 2005), we were asked to 
review the defendant‘s conviction for selling a stolen firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).  The mens rea requirement in that 
provision, like the one at issue here, imposes liability upon a 
defendant who receives a firearm that he knows or has reasonable 
cause to believe is stolen.  We recognized that the phrase 
―reasonable cause to believe‖ was undefined by statute and that it 
was the subject of little decisional authority.  Indeed, we observed 
that ―[o]nly the Eighth Circuit has discussed the language 
meaningfully.‖  McBane, 433 F.3d at 349 n.9.  We then set forth 
the Eighth Circuit‘s analysis of the phrase: 
 
It may be read as requiring proof only that the 
defendant [sold] a gun that the so-called ‗reasonable 
person‘ would have believed was stolen in the 
circumstances of the case.  But the better reading, 
we believe, requires proof that a defendant [sold] a 
gun that it would have been reasonable for him or 
her in particular, to believe was stolen. 
 
Id. (quoting United States v. Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 
2004)).  In McBane, we held that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury verdict under either interpretation of ―reasonable 
cause to believe‖; thus, we declined to decide which reading of the 
phrase was correct.  In like fashion, we conclude that there was 
substantial evidence to support Tyson‘s conviction under either 
reading of the scienter requirement.  We therefore leave a more 
rigorous statutory analysis for another day. 
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least established that Tyson had reasonable cause to believe 
the firearms would be possessed without a firearms license.  
We agree. 
 Tyson transported as many as thirty-five firearms to 
the Virgin Islands over the course of seven months.  As we 
explained above, a reasonable jury could conclude that Tyson 
sold twenty-three of these weapons and that he intended to do 
the same with the eleven he imported on July 31.  He sold at 
least one of these weapons at a significant markup, and there 
was evidence that Tyson profited from his other sales as well.  
Furthermore, in four trips to the Virgin Islands, Tyson made 
no attempt to comply with the local licensing scheme; he did 
not register any of the firearms he had imported prior to July 
31, and he never applied for or received a license to carry a 
firearm on the island.  A reasonable jury could have assessed 
the sum of this evidence—repetitive bootleg sales for above-
market prices—and found that Tyson flouted local licensing 
requirements in order to transact business with individuals 
who were themselves unlicensed.  After all, Tyson‘s 
customers presumably paid above-market prices because they 
were unable to obtain a firearm through legitimate channels.  
Tyson‘s repeated sales to individuals who were likely to be 
unlicensed allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that he 
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. 
The District Court‘s judgment of acquittal was 
therefore in error.  We will vacate that disposition with 
instructions to reinstate the jury verdict. 
C Transferring a Firearm to a Person the Transferor 
Knows or Has Reasonable Cause to Believe is a 
Resident of Another State 
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 The indictment charged Tyson with one count of 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5),
16
 which makes it unlawful 
                                                 
16
 Specifically, Count Twenty-Six of the indictment reads, ―On or 
about the[sic] July 31, 2008, at St. Thomas, in the District of the 
Virgin Islands, the defendant, Shawn Tyson, not being a licensed 
importer, manufacturer, dealer, and collector of firearms, within 
the meaning of Chapter 44, Title 18, United States Code, did 
attempt to willfully transfer, transport, and deliver firearms . . . to a 
person, said person not being a licensed importer, manufacturer, 
dealer, and collector of firearms, within the meaning of Chapter 
44, Title 18, United States Code, and knowing and with reasonable 
cause to believe that said person was not then residing in the state 
of Tennessee, the state in which the defendant was residing at the 
time of the aforesaid transfer, transportation, and delivery of the 
firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) and 924(a)(1)(D).‖  
(Emphasis added.)  By its terms, § 922(a)(5) does not criminalize 
the attempt to transfer a firearm to an out-of-state resident.  But we 
do not read this count as one charging attempt.  Nor do the parties 
for that matter.  The reason is clear enough.  Count Twenty-Six 
describes (by model and serial number) the eleven firearms that 
Tyson placed in Morrell‘s vehicle on July 31, 2008.  It cites § 
922(a)(5), a provision that criminalizes the actual transfer of 
firearms.  It refers to ―the aforesaid transfer, transportation, and 
delivery of the firearms,‖ rather than the ―aforesaid attempted 
transfer, transportation, and delivery.‖  And an earlier count in the 
indictment alleges that Tyson transported the same eleven firearms 
(also identified by model and serial number) to the Virgin Islands 
and delivered them into Morrell‘s possession.  Thus, Tyson was 
under no illusion as to the crime with which he was charged: the 
unlawful transfer of a firearm to an out-of-state resident.  See 
United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73, 78–79 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that an indictment is sufficient if it, inter alia, contains 
the elements of the offense and sufficiently apprises the defendant 
of the crime charged); see also United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 
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for any person (other than a licensed importer, 
licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or 
licensed collector) to transfer, sell, trade, give, 
transport, or deliver any firearm to any person 
(other than a licensed importer, licensed 
manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed 
collector) who the transferor knows or has 
reasonable cause to believe does not reside in . . 
. the State in which the transferor resides. 
Proof that a defendant violated § 922(a)(5) requires 
substantial evidence of three elements: (1) neither the 
defendant nor the recipient of the firearm were licensed 
importers, manufacturers, dealers, or collectors; (2) the 
defendant willfully transferred the firearm to another person; 
and (3) the defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe 
that the person to whom he transferred the firearm resided in 
a state other than the defendant‘s state of residence.  Id.; 18 
U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D). 
 Elements one and three are not in dispute.  Nor do the 
parties challenge the fact that Tyson ―transferred‖ eleven 
firearms to Morrell on July 31, 2008.
17
  The question, again, 
                                                                                                             
754, 771 (3d Cir. 2005) (―‗We consider an indictment sufficient if, 
when considered in its entirety, it adequately informs the defendant 
of the charges against her such that she may prepare a defense and 
invoke the double jeopardy clause when appropriate.‘‖ (quoting 
United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002))). 
17
 To ―transfer‖ a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) means to 
deliver possession of the weapon to another person.  The District 
Court instructed the jury that ―possession‖ may be ―constructive, 
sole and joint.‖  Tyson does not question whether there was 
sufficient evidence to prove Morrell ―possessed‖ the firearms by 
virtue of their placement into his vehicle. 
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is whether Tyson effectuated this transfer with a sufficiently 
culpable state of mind.  The jury answered this query in the 
affirmative, but the District Court found the evidence 
insufficient to support such a result.  The Court reasoned that 
in order to show Tyson willfully transferred firearms to 
Morrell, the government was required to establish that he had 
actual knowledge of § 922(a)(5)‘s licensing provision.  
Finding insufficient evidence of such proof, the Court set 
aside the jury‘s verdict. 
 The District Court misinterpreted what it means for a 
defendant to act willfully in this context.  As we explained 
above, to establish a willful violation of the federal firearms 
trafficking statute, the government must ―prove that the 
defendant acted with knowledge that the conduct was 
unlawful.‖18  Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192 (quoting Ratzlaf, 510 
U.S. at 137).  In the context of § 922(a)(5), it was therefore 
incumbent upon the government to show, not that Tyson 
knew that he was subject to a particular federal licensing 
scheme, but that he knew it was unlawful for him to transfer 
firearms to a resident of the Virgin Islands.  There is 
sufficient evidence to support such a conclusion.  ATF Form 
4473, which Tyson executed each time he purchased a 
firearm, informed him that the repetitive purchase and resale 
of firearms for livelihood and profit was a federal crime.  He 
falsely claimed that his firearms were antiques, called himself 
a firearms ―collector,‖ and coded accounting documents, all 
in order to evade detection.  Furthermore, Tyson disregarded 
Virgin Islands registration and licensing requirements so that 
                                                 
18
 In Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998), the Supreme 
Court explicitly rejected the contention that proof of willful 
misconduct requires evidence that a defendant knew of the 
licensing requirements in the federal firearms statutes.  
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he could expeditiously traffic guns on the black market.
19
  
From this evidence, and in light of the record as a whole, the 
jury could reasonably infer that Tyson acted with an ―evil-
meaning mind‖; he knew that it was unlawful to transport 
firearms to St. Thomas and deliver those weapons to Morrell, 
an out-of-state resident.  See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191–93 
(explaining that to prove the defendant acted willfully, the 
government must show that he or she acted with ―bad 
purpose‖ to disobey or disregard the law).   
The District Court‘s contrary conclusion was in error.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of acquittal on this 
count with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict.  
D Conspiracy to Unlawfully Transport Firearms 
 In addition to the substantive trafficking counts 
discussed above, Count One of the indictment charged Tyson 
and Morrell, along with persons known and unknown, with 
conspiracy to unlawfully transport firearms in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  To sustain Tyson‘s conviction under this 
count, the evidence must be sufficient to show that (1) the 
alleged conspirators shared a common goal or purpose, viz. to 
traffic firearms illegally, (2) Tyson knew of that purpose and 
intended to achieve it, and (3) Tyson reached an agreement 
with his alleged co-conspirators to achieve the conspiracy‘s 
aims.  United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 
                                                 
19
 After Tyson‘s arrest, he told ATF Agent Stricklin that he had 
intended to register the eleven firearms, but was stopped by the 
police before he could do so.  This statement shows that at the time 
of his arrest, Tyson knew about the registration requirements.  The 
jury could reasonably infer that he  knew about those requirements 
throughout the duration of his trafficking scheme. 
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2006); United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 
2001); see also Boria, 592 F.3d at 481 (explaining that the 
conspiracy‘s common goal or purpose must be illegal).  This 
Court has characterized the third factor set forth above—an 
agreement between the defendant and another individual—as 
―the essence of the [conspiracy] offense.‖  Pressler, 256 F.3d 
at 147.  It is, in other words, the sine qua non of the crime 
itself.  United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 
1999) (stating that ―‗a conspiracy requires an agreement to 
commit some other crime beyond the crime constituted by the 
agreement itself.‘‖ (quoting United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 
795, 808 (7th Cir. 1994))). 
 When a conspiracy conviction is at issue, we must 
closely scrutinize the sufficiency of the evidence.  United 
States v. Schramm, 75 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1996) (―‗[T]he 
sufficiency of the evidence in a conspiracy prosecution 
requires close scrutiny.‘‖ (quoting United States v. Coleman, 
811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987))).  The reason is self-
evident: a defendant‘s guilt must always remain ―individual 
and personal.‖  Boria, 592 F.3d at 480; United States v. 
Samuels, 741 F.2d 570, 575 (3d Cir. 1984).  ―‗[S]light 
evidence of a defendant‘s connection with a conspiracy is 
insufficient to support a guilty verdict.‘‖  Brodie, 403 F.3d at 
134 (quoting Coleman, 811 F.2d at 808).  Furthermore, a 
conspiracy may not be proved merely ―‗by piling inference 
upon inference‘ where those inferences do not logically 
support the ultimate finding of guilt.‖  Id. (quoting Coleman, 
811 F.2d at 808). 
 In the instant matter, the District Court held that there 
was not substantial evidence to prove that Tyson entered into 
an illicit agreement to traffic firearms with at least one other 
individual.  The government disputes this finding and 
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contends that a reasonable jury could have inferred that Tyson 
and Morrell entered into an illegal agreement based upon 
their ―unusual and suspicious activity in Tennessee and the 
Virgin Islands.‖  For his part, Tyson argues that the District 
Court‘s disposition should be affirmed.  Moreover, he claims 
that his criminal liability is foreclosed as a matter of law by 
the jury‘s acquittal of Morrell—Tyson‘s only alleged co-
conspirator.  To support this assertion, Tyson invokes the 
common law ―rule of consistency,‖ which requires the 
reversal of a conspiracy conviction when all of a defendant‘s 
alleged co-conspirators are acquitted of the same conspiracy 
charge in the same trial.  We begin by addressing Tyson‘s 
―rule of consistency‖ argument before evaluating the 
sufficiency of the evidence adduced by the government in its 
case-in-chief. 
1 Applicability of the Rule of Consistency 
 The doctrine known as the ―rule of consistency‖ 
requires that where all possible co-conspirators are jointly 
tried, and all but one are acquitted, the conviction of the 
remaining co-conspirator must be set aside.  United States v. 
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 383 n.11 (3d Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Gordon, 242 F.2d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1956); see also Gov’t 
of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 
1985) (Garth, J., concurring).  The idea, as articulated by one 
of our sister courts of appeals, is ―that the acquittal of all but 
one potential conspirator negates the possibility of an 
agreement between the sole remaining defendant and one of 
those acquitted of the conspiracy and thereby denies, by 
definition, the existence of any conspiracy at all.‖  United 
States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1980).  
Application of the rule is narrow: it does not apply when 
alleged co-conspirators are tried separately and only one 
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defendant is convicted.  See Hoheb, 777 F.2d at 140–41.  Nor 
is it applicable when ―it is alleged and proven that the 
defendant conspired with persons unknown.‖20  Id. (citing 
cases). 
 The rule of consistency was at one time uniformly 
followed in both federal and state courts.  Chad W. Coulter, 
Comment, The Unnecessary Rule of Consistency in 
Conspiracy Trials, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 223, 225 (1986).  But 
the rule‘s viability was dealt a serious blow in the 1980s, 
when the Supreme Court issued its unanimous decision in 
Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57 (1984).  Powell, who 
was tried alone, was found guilty of using a telephone to 
facilitate the drug conspiracy for which she was acquitted.  
The Court held that although this result was inconsistent, it 
was not for a judge to go behind the jury‘s decision in such 
circumstances.  True, the verdict may have been the product 
of juror error or plain irrationality.  But an inconsistent 
verdict may also be the product of juror lenity, which 
historically has operated ―as a check against arbitrary or 
oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch.‖  Id. 
at 65.  The point, according to Powell, is that a reviewing 
court cannot know why the jury reached its verdict.  Rather 
than task courts with the responsibility to find out, the Powell 
Court held that inconsistent verdicts are not reviewable 
merely because they are inconsistent.  Id. at 66. 
                                                 
20
 The indictment in this case charged Tyson and Morrell of 
conspiring with persons known and unknown.  However, the 
record does not contain substantial evidence to support a charge 
based on an agreement with unindicted or unknown persons.  
Furthermore, the government‘s argument on appeal is based 
exclusively on Tyson‘s purported agreement with Morrell. 
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 Powell does not directly address inconsistency among 
jointly tried co-conspirators, but every court of appeals to 
consider the question has held that Powell‘s logic fatally 
undermines the rule of consistency.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Morton, 412 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Nichols, 374 F.3d 959, 970–71 & n.9 (10th Cir. 2004), 
vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005); United 
States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 566–67 (6th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 878 & n.3 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 
593, 595–96 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Valles-Valencia, 
823 F.2d 381, 382 (9th Cir. 1987).  As the Sixth Circuit has 
explained, under Powell, ―the acquittal of all but one co-
conspirator during the same trial does not necessarily indicate 
that the jury found no agreement to act.‖  Crayton, 357 F.3d 
at 565.  Instead, the verdict may represent a manifestation of 
lenity, which Powell clearly held was not subject to judicial 
review.  Id. 
 We have not had occasion to address the continuing 
applicability of the rule of consistency in multi-defendant 
conspiracy trials.
21
  We do so now and hold that the rule is no 
longer viable in cases such as the one at bar.  The jury‘s 
verdict, even if it is not consistent, may reflect the decision to 
exercise lenity with respect to one or more defendants.  See 
Powell, 469 U.S. at 65.  To exercise such discretion is the 
jury‘s prerogative, which we will not disturb simply to 
                                                 
21
 In a concurring opinion some twenty-five years ago, our 
colleague, Judge Garth, characterized the rule of consistency as a 
―vestige of the past,‖ inapplicable in a joint conspiracy trial.  Gov’t 
of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(Garth, J., concurring).  Judge Garth was prescient, and his view is 
now the view of this Court. 
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achieve symmetry of results.  See Standefer v. United States, 
477 U.S. 10, 25 (1980).  Tyson‘s invocation of the rule of 
consistency is thus to no avail.  His conviction will stand or 
fall based upon the sufficiency of the government‘s evidence. 
2 Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 The District Court concluded that the government‘s 
evidence was insufficient to show that Tyson and Morrell 
reached an agreement to unlawfully traffic firearms in 
violation of federal law.  The issue here is not whether Tyson 
engaged in unilateral trafficking activity; nor is it whether 
Morrell knew Tyson was so engaged.  Rather, the pertinent 
inquiry is whether Tyson and Morrell agreed to achieve the 
conspiracy‘s ends.  Conspirators, of course, rarely leave 
evidence of an explicit understanding or common goal.  
United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 353 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Indeed, ―common sense suggests, and experience confirms, 
that illegal agreements are rarely, if ever, reduced to writing 
or verbalized with the precision that is characteristic of a 
written contract.‖  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238 
(3d Cir. 2007).  We have therefore recognized that the 
existence of a conspiratorial agreement may be proven by 
circumstantial evidence alone.  Brodie, 403 F.3d at 134 
(stating that ―the very nature of the crime of conspiracy is 
such that it often may be established only by indirect and 
circumstantial evidence‖).  The District Court correctly 
recognized this point of law, but nonetheless found that ―the 
government . . . failed to show any integration of activities 
between Tyson and any other individual that could indirectly 
prove the existence of a preconceived plan or common 
understanding to traffic firearms.‖ 
 The government acknowledges that it advanced no 
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direct evidence that Tyson and Morrell reached an illicit 
agreement to traffic firearms.  It focuses instead on what it 
calls a pattern of ―unusual and suspicious activity in 
Tennessee and the Virgin Islands.‖  Specifically: Tyson and 
Morrell flew from the Virgin Islands to Tennessee on 
February 13, 2008.  Morrell stayed with Tyson in his Bristol 
residence for one week.  Tyson purchased fourteen 
semiautomatic firearms in and around Bristol during the week 
of Morrell‘s stay.  On February 20, Tyson and Morrell 
traveled back to the Virgin Islands.  Both checked luggage 
containing firearms.  Finally, when Tyson flew back to St. 
Thomas on July 31, Morrell was waiting at the airport to pick 
him up.  According to the government, this series of ―unusual 
acts,‖ considered in the context of the record as a whole, 
amount to substantial evidence that Tyson and Morrell 
entered into the conspiratorial agreement charged in the 
indictment. 
 We have previously explained that where several 
alleged co-conspirators engage in coordinated, ―unusual 
acts,‖ one may reasonably infer the existence of a tacit 
agreement.  For instance, in United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 
473 (3d Cir. 2002), five police officers were charged in a 
criminal conspiracy to violate Earl Faison‘s civil rights.  The 
officers arrested Faison and beat him to death under the 
mistaken belief that he had killed one of their colleagues.  At 
trial, the officers argued that while they might have been 
subject to criminal liability for the underlying offense, there 
was insufficient proof that they had agreed to engage in 
coordinated illegality.  The evidence, however, indicated that 
during the course of events, the officers jointly contravened a 
number of their department‘s operating procedures governing 
the apprehension and interrogation of criminal suspects.  Id. 
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at 476.  For example, the officers arrested Faison and took 
him to the jail for questioning instead of the county 
prosecutor‘s office, where suspects were supposed to be 
taken; the officers entered the jail through the south entrance 
when protocol dictated that the north entrance was the 
designated prisoner drop-off area; Faison was never 
fingerprinted or photographed, nor was he taken to the 
booking room; after Faison died from the beating 
administered by his assailants, several officers submitted 
consistent but false incident reports.  Id.  We described this 
collective deviation from standard operating procedure as 
―unusual‖ and explained, ―The fact that [the officers] . . . 
engaged as a group in so many unusual acts could certainly 
lead a reasonable juror to the conclusion that there was at 
least a tacit agreement between the officers, formed at the 
scene of the arrest, that Faison was to be assaulted.‖  Id. at 
478–79. 
 By characterizing the activities of Tyson and Morrell 
as ―unusual,‖ the government attempts to cast a pall of 
suspicion over their week-long interaction.  But applying 
labels is insufficient.  Unfortunately, the government makes 
little attempt to explain what is so ―unusual‖ about the 
conduct at issue.  The government does not argue, for 
instance, that the behavior of Tyson and Morrell deviated 
from some baseline norm.  Nor can they.  Almost all of the 
facts highlighted by the government focus upon lawful 
conduct.  What is more, we know almost nothing about 
Tyson‘s interactions with Morrell or Morrell‘s stay in 
Tennessee.  What little we do know is for the most part 
mundane: Morrell arrived on the same flight as Tyson, he was 
present when police came to the residence on February 14, 
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and he departed after staying one week.
22
  On the day of his 
departure, Morrell traveled to the airport along with Tyson.  
Both men checked baggage containing firearms.  They then 
appear to have parted ways until July 31, 2008.   
It is difficult to draw any useful inferences from the 
discrete facts set forth above.  The evidence certainly does not 
suggest coordinated action in support of a common goal.  To 
constitute coordinated action, there must be some link 
between the co-conspirators‘ conduct that suggests 
integration or unity of purpose.  Pressler, 256 F.3d at 155; 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 200–02; United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 
464, 467 (3d Cir. 1994).  Co-conspirator A may serve as a 
lookout for co-conspirator B; two co-conspirators may 
consult with one another to fix a sale price; co-conspirators 
may communicate in code.  Here, there is no link between the 
two men, nor anything to show that one is facilitating the 
handiwork of the other.  True, Tyson and Morrell arrived at 
the airport on February 20 together.  But this is not evidence 
that they were assisting one another.
23
  See Pressler, 256 F.3d 
                                                 
22
 The evidence does show that Tyson unilaterally—and legally—
purchased multiple firearms during the week that Morrell was his 
houseguest.  There is no evidence, however, that Morrell assisted 
Tyson in his endeavors.  Several firearms merchants from the 
Bristol area testified; none identified Morrell or testified to seeing 
him along with Tyson.   
23
 In addition, the government presented no evidence from which to 
reasonably infer that either Tyson or Morrell knew that what the 
other was doing was illegal.  Both lawfully checked their 
respective firearms for flight in Tennessee; to infer that Tyson 
knew Morrell was not licensed to possess a firearm in the Virgin 
Islands (or vice versa) is to infer the existence of facts from 
evidence that simply was not proffered.  See United States v. 
Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 150 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (―We may not 
35 
 
at 153 (finding insufficient evidence of a tacit agreement 
when alleged co-conspirators merely traveled to Philadelphia 
together to purchase narcotics).  It is, at most, proof of 
parallel conduct—two individuals attempting to import 
firearms into the Virgin Islands.  A conspiracy prosecution 
requires more. 
Morrell‘s role in the events of July 31 is perhaps the 
sole bit of evidence indicative of ―coordinated‖ action.  
Indeed, this is a significant bit of proof, but not enough.  In a 
sufficiency inquiry, we cannot evaluate evidence in isolation, 
but must determine ―‗whether all the pieces of evidence, 
taken together, make a strong enough case to let a jury find 
[the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‘‖  Brodie, 
403 F.3d at 134 (quoting Coleman, 811 F.2d at 807).  Here, 
Tyson was engaged in trafficking activity for some seven 
months before he was arrested.  Morrell‘s role in this seven-
month narrative spans the length of one week.  There is no 
evidence that Morrell assisted Tyson during any of his first 
three trips to the Virgin Islands, much less interacted with 
him.  Nor is there evidence that the two communicated with 
each other when Tyson was stateside.  Had the government 
presented proof of some recurrent pattern of coordinated 
conduct, then perhaps we might rethink our calculus.  But the 
government has offered no such thing and, in the context of 
the record as a whole, Morrell‘s presence at the airport is 
simply too slim a reed upon which to hang a criminal 
conspiracy conviction. 
 The government would no doubt claim that we are 
overlooking crucial circumstantial evidence that tends to 
                                                                                                             
‗infer‘ the existence of evidence that was simply never 
proffered.‖). 
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support its position on appeal.  In particular, Morrell testified 
that Tyson paid at least $800 of the cost for him to fly from 
St. Thomas to Tennessee.  Morrell also admitted on cross 
examination that during his stay in Tennessee he (1) 
accompanied Tyson to at least one gun store, (2) visited a 
firing range with Tyson, and (3) posed for photographs at 
Tyson‘s residence, guns in hand.  But because all of this 
testimony was admitted after the close of the government‘s 
evidence, we cannot consider it.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b); 
Brodie, 403 F.3d at 134.  Under Rule 29, the government may 
not rely upon testimony admitted through Morrell‘s cross 
examination.  Rather, the prosecution must rise or fall solely 
on the basis of the government‘s proof.  Tyson is, in other 
words, entitled to a verdict based only upon a snapshot of the 
evidence as it existed when the government concluded its 
case-in-chief.  Moore, 504 F.3d at 1347.  
In sum, the jury lacked sufficient evidence to find that 
Tyson and Morrell entered into a tacit agreement to traffic 
firearms in violation of federal law.  We have no doubt that 
Tyson was engaged in unlawful trafficking activity and, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, it is reasonable to infer that Morrell knew about 
some of Tyson‘s illicit conduct.  But our conspiracy 
jurisprudence does not sanction guilt by association.  United 
States v. Terselich, 885 F.2d 1094, 1098 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(stating that ―the company an individual chooses to keep‖ is 
not evidence of a conspiracy).  We will therefore affirm the 
ruling of the District Court granting judgment of acquittal on 
the conspiracy count. 
E Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm Under the 
Virgin Islands Code 
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 The Virgin Islands Code makes it unlawful for any 
person to have, possess, transport, or carry a firearm without a 
locally-issued license to do so.  23 V.I.C. § 454; 14 V.I.C. § 
2253(a).  Tyson was charged with eleven counts of violating 
this provision—one count for each of the firearms he 
transported onto the island on July 31, 2008.  The jury 
convicted Tyson on ten of these counts, and the District Court 
denied Tyson‘s motion for judgment of acquittal.  Tyson 
appeals the District Court‘s order, though he acknowledges 
that the government proved he was in possession of the 
eleven firearms without a license.  Tyson argues, however, 
that he had an affirmative defense under two separate 
licensing provisions of the Virgin Islands Code: 23 V.I.C. § 
460 and 23 V.I.C. § 470(b).  Section 460 requires authorities 
in the Virgin Islands to recognize a firearms license validly 
issued by another state or territory.  Section 470(b) states that 
if an individual imports firearms into the Virgin Islands 
without a license to do so, he or she may avoid criminal 
liability by ―immediately‖ registering the imported weapons.  
Tyson argues that either provision furnishes a defense for 
unauthorized firearm possession. 
 Tyson did not request a jury instruction for either so-
called affirmative defense and the District Court did not 
provide one.  Tyson also did not object to the Court‘s 
instructions after they were given.  Where a party fails to 
object to the district court‘s jury instructions, ―he waives the 
issue on appeal, ‗unless the error was so fundamental and 
highly prejudicial as to constitute plain error.‘‖  United States 
v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1261 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(quoting Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987)); 
see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d) (stating that failure to object 
to the court‘s jury instructions ―precludes appellate review, 
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except as permitted under Rule 52(b)‖).  To find plain error, 
we must conclude that (1) there was error; (2) the error was 
clear or obvious; (3) the error affected the defendant‘s 
substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the legal 
proceeding.  United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 
2010).  If the defendant satisfies this showing, we may, but 
are not required to, order correction.  United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1993) (explaining that the discretion 
conferred by plain error review ―should be employed in those 
circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would 
otherwise result‖ (internal quotation omitted)). 
1 23 V.I.C. § 460: Reciprocal Recognition of Out-of-
State Licenses 
Section 460 states, in pertinent part, that the Virgin Islands 
shall recognize a firearms license validly issued by another 
state or territory and ―shall allow the [licensee] to exercise all 
of the privileges in connection therewith.‖  23 V.I.C. § 460.  
Courts have characterized this provision as a ―statutory 
exception to the firearm license requirement‖ and 
acknowledged, albeit implicitly, that it provides an 
affirmative defense to a charge for unauthorized possession of 
a firearm.  See United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 631 (3d 
Cir. 1997); Toussaint v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 301 F. 
Supp. 2d 420, 423–24 (D.V.I. 2004) (holding that § 460 is an 
affirmative defense to § 2253(a)). 
 To be entitled to an instruction on an affirmative 
defense, the defendant must present sufficient evidence from 
which a jury could find in his or her favor on the defense.  See 
United States v. Bay, 852 F.2d 702, 704 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Tyson proffered no evidence to suggest that he was licensed 
39 
 
to possess or deal in firearms anywhere in the United States.  
Under such circumstances, it would have served no purpose 
to instruct the jury on a § 460 defense, untethered as it would 
have been to the evidence of record.  Accordingly, we detect 
no plain error and Tyson‘s argument is without merit. 
2 23 V.I.C. § 470(b): Report of Firearms Purchased 
Outside or Brought into the Virgin Islands 
 
Pursuant to 23 V.I.C. § 470(b), 
Any person upon entering the Virgin Islands 
bringing with him any firearm or ammunition 
shall report in writing or in person to the 
Commissioner immediately of his arrival, 
furnishing a complete description of the firearm 
or ammunition brought into the Virgin Islands.  
He shall also furnish his own name, date of 
birth and occupation. 
We have held that this provision sets forth an affirmative 
defense to an unauthorized possession of a firearm charge.  
McKie, 112 F.3d at 631.  We have not, however, 
meaningfully discussed the contours of such a defense.  Nor 
need we do so here.  Simply put, Tyson did not request an 
instruction on a § 470(b) defense.  Perhaps this was oversight.  
Perhaps it was strategy.  After all, although the evidence 
arguably would have supported a § 470(b) instruction, Tyson 
may have reasoned that to present the defense would only 
serve to highlight his clear guilt under the prima facie 
elements of § 2253(a).  A defendant‘s strategy is his own.  It 
is not for the district court to sua sponte determine which 
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defenses are appropriate under the circumstances.  In short, if 
Tyson wished to mount a defense under § 470(b), it was 
incumbent upon him to take the initiative to do so.   
The order of the District Court denying Tyson‘s 
motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis of § 470(b) will 
therefore be affirmed.
24
 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part and 
affirm in part the final order of the District Court.  We will 
reverse the order on the following charges: (1) twelve counts 
of transporting a firearm in the course of dealing firearms 
without a license (Counts Two through Thirteen); (2) one 
count of transporting a firearm with knowledge or reasonable 
cause to believe that it would be used to commit a crime 
(Count Twenty-Five); and (3) one count of transferring a 
                                                 
24
 Chief Judge McKee does not believe that the record here would 
support the affirmative defenses set forth in 23 V.I.C. §§ 460 and 
470(b) because Tyson made several trips to the Virgin Islands and 
not once registered the firearms he was transporting.  However, 
Chief Judge McKee does not agree that those defenses can be 
deemed waived because of the unique procedural posture of this 
appeal.  As noted, Tyson moved for a judgment of acquittal at the 
close of the government‘s case-in-chief, and the District Court 
reserved its ruling on that motion.  Accordingly, Chief Judge 
McKee notes that we must review the Court‘s ultimate denial of 
the motion as the record stood at the close of the government‘s 
case, and it would have been premature to request any jury 
instructions then because the defense had not yet rested.  See Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 29(b).  Since the affirmative defenses are not supported 
by the record, however, Chief Judge McKee agrees that Tyson‘s 
attempt to rely on those defenses now is meritless. 
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firearm to an out-of-state resident (Count Twenty-Six).  We 
will affirm the order of the District Court granting Rule 29 
relief on the charge of conspiracy to unlawfully transport 
firearms (Count One).  Finally, we will affirm Tyson‘s 
conviction on ten counts of unauthorized possession of a 
firearm under the Virgin Islands Code.  This matter is 
remanded for further proceedings.  
 
